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What about the Left? 
Wolfgang Streeck 
Hardly any of the innumerable comments now being published on the outcome of the elec-
tion of a new European Parliament (EP) even mention the radical, as distinguished from the 
social-democratic, Left. This is an expression of contempt, and it is well-deserved. Five years 
ago the Left, under the clumsy label of GUE/NGL (Confederal Group of the European 
Left/Nordic Green Left), was led by none other than Alexis Tsipras, later, as Greek Prime 
Minister, he became Angela Merkel’s favorite disciple in the art of treason. With time, after 
collecting various splinter groups, the GUE/NGL cobbled together a total of 52 seats, a little 
less than seven percent of the EP’s 751 seats. Now, in 2019, it ended up with 38, a loss of 
more than a quarter.  
The near-death experience of the European Left, or more precisely: its European par-
liamentary representation, came at a time when the old parties of the center, left and right, 
suffered dramatic setbacks, together winning only 329 seats, 44 percent of the total, a com-
bined loss of 75 seats that put an end to their Grand Coalition parliamentary majority. It also 
coincided with a steep rise of the vote for a variety of parties of a new, if not always entirely 
new, nationalist Right (114 seats, a plus of 36), and a similarly impressive gain of the Greens, 
from 52 to 70 seats, making them now almost twice as strong as the Left. When, if not in 
times like these of rapidly shifting political allegiances, should the Left expect to make elec-
toral progress with European workers and reformist sections of the European middle-class? 
There is an urgent need to explain its disastrous failure to do so. Four reasons come to mind; 
certainly there are more. 
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The first and most basic one is the total absence, as far as I can see, of a realistic anti-
capitalist, or at least anti-neoliberal, Left political strategy related to the European Union 
(EU). There is not even a debate on the crucial issue of whether the EU can at all be a vehicle 
for anti-capitalist politics. Instead there is a naïve or opportunistic acceptance – hard to say 
which is worse – of the feel-good “Europeanism” so popular among young people and so 
useful for both Green electioneering and European technocrats seeking legitimacy for their 
neoliberal regime. No mention, in particular, of the way in which the EU’s de facto constitu-
tion limits the political space for any anti-capitalist and even laborist program, with its safely 
enshrined free markets (the “four freedoms”), the de facto dictatorship of the European 
Court, and the balanced budget austerity provisions under European Monetary Union. In 
particular, any critical discussion of the EU’s central social policy, the free movement of labor 
between the now economically extremely different member countries, is strictly avoided, 
combined with hints of sympathy for open borders generally, including those with the out-
side world. This does nothing but validate the image spread by the Greens and the center-
left middle-class parties of Europe being mainly about young people traveling without bor-
der controls and not needing to change money. It also comes with entirely illusory policy 
projects, for example a European minimum wage, which only after insistent questioning is 
admitted would have to be differentiated by countries. Predictably, that project has drawn 
no water whatsoever either in the poor countries of the Union, where people find it too 
good to be true, or in the rich countries where workers in particular fear that somehow it 
would be them who would have to pay the bill for the Left’s “European solidarity”. 
Second, in most if not all countries the Left found it irresistible to join the old and 
new center parties – Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, the Greens – in declaring the 
new nationalist Right an imminent threat to democracy, to be defended against by voting 
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“for Europe”. In fact, often enough the Left raised the stake by suggesting that the new Right 
was in fact a very old Right, and not voting for it was a contemporary version of the anti-
fascist struggle of the interwar years. This dangerously blurred the difference between legal 
opposition parties in a democracy, ugly as their speech and thought may be, and private ar-
mies aiming to replace a democratic with a dictatorial state. Such historical confusion played 
into the hands especially of the Greens, in several ways. Exaggerating the threat from the 
new Tight was certain to drive voters into the arms of liberal establishment parties promis-
ing “stability” in hard times. If fascism was something to be defeated by voting for “more 
Europe”, there was no need to go as far as vote for the radical Left; voting for the new dar-
lings of the middle-class would suffice. If democracy is parliaments without neo-nationalist 
“populists”, voting every five years for a “non-populist” party will do. One should have 
thought that a Left worth its name and ambition should know that democracy may be under 
threat even if there are no “fascists” around at all, alleged or real. The very center parties, 
the same on whose side the European Left has fought its electoral phony war against rising 
fascism in Europe, are perfectly enough to undermine democracy as they submit their coun-
tries to a neoliberal political-economic order that imposes on them an untouchable free 
trade regime, a gold standard-like monetary policy, austerity public finances, and a union-
free labor market with an unlimited labor supply. While defending democracy is always a 
good thing, in joining the fight the Left could at least have pointed out that democracy is not 
just getting the vote for a powerless parliament right but also needs to provide for local gov-
ernment autonomy, collective bargaining and trade union representation, worker voice on 
the shopfloor and on the boards of large firms, a public property regime conducive to high 
public investment, a truly pluralist mass media etc. It appears unlikely that here the Greens 
could be reliable allies.  
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Third, the radical Left had no idea how to handle the issue of climate change, which 
came up in time to play into the hands of the Greens. In this the Left did not differ at all from 
the established center parties. That the theme was always difficult for it is easy to under-
stand. Calls for higher taxes on gasoline or less consumption of cheap meat, or meat in gen-
eral, are easier to live with, and sometimes to heed, for the middle class than for the lower 
and working class. Appeals to individual virtue reach the bad conscience of the environmen-
tally woke, but not those who feel a need to catch up in consumption with their betters. Ra-
ther than chiming in when the Greens and their bourgeois elders sing their siren songs, what 
should matter for the Left is that voluntary changes in lifestyle are vastly inadequate anyway 
for stopping global warming or the long ongoing decline of biodiversity. A Left that limits 
itself to reciting the Greens’ scary stories about an impending end of life on the planet drives 
many of its potential voters into denial, and from there into the arms of the New Right. To 
leave behind the white lies of green environmentalism the Left needs a realistic program, 
not just to stop environmental deterioration – for this it may be too late – but also to repair 
its results. This would require significant increases in public spending, to be funded at least 
in part by public debt beyond austerity debt limits, partly replacing private with public con-
sumption to adapt social and economic life to a changed physical environment. A Green New 
Deal of this kind would create jobs in addition to raising taxes and would on balance benefit 
rather than burden the working class.  
Fourth and finally, although the writing had long been on the wall, the Left has badly 
underestimated what early socialists called the “national question” and its importance for its 
core constituency. For them “Europe” is a far-away technocracy, a world outside of their life 
experience. This is not much different from the middle class – which, however, has learned, 
and prefers, to pretend it knows who is doing what in Brussels, which of nobody outside of a 
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narrow circle of specialists does. Details, however, do not really matter for it as “Europe” has 
become a mood, a feeling rather than an institution, a symbol of a happy, hip “cosmopoli-
tan” consumerist life, if with a few environmentalist corrections, where “pro-Europeanism” 
is essential for admission to an urban social milieu to which the leaders and activists of radi-
cal left parties belong but only very few of their members and voters. For the latter, political 
and administrative centralization means a diminished voice for the little man and the little 
woman who feel no affinity with and no need for a supranational identity and who feel dis-
enfranchised as their nation-state is de-legitimized and disempowered in the name of “Eu-
ropean” supranationalism. In the eyes of contemporary lifestyle internationalists, this makes 
them, the social heirs of traditional working-class internationalism, appear hopelessly back-
ward culturally, which makes it impossible for their parties, even if they conspicuously join in 
the middle class’s Europeanist enthusiasm, to attract any sizeable fraction of the neoliberal 
internationalist community. Nor can they, in their modernized appearance, attract those 
who do not share in, and are at the receiving end of, the consumerist optimism of the urban 
cosmopolitans.  Especially among the German Left, the concept of the nation-state as a vital 
democratic institution is deeply discredited today, an attitude that the Linkspartei bought 
into wholesale when it mobbed Sahra Wagenknecht out of its leadership. Now just as the 
Greens, all major political problems are relegated in Left political speech to a European level 
of democratic politics that doesn’t exist outside of the party’s imagination and won’t exist 
for any foreseeable future; “Europe”, and the European Parliament in particular, as a deposi-
tory of pious hopes, until it will be discovered that the Europeanists have overplayed their 
cards and, busy with trying to re-educate their voters in the cosmopolitan spirit, forgotten 
the political toolkit that was waiting for them at the national level.  
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To conclude with a personal view. An institution like the EU, deliberately designed to 
immunize capitalism against anti-capitalist politics, is useless for anti-capitalist politics; it 
must be bypassed or fought where it stands in the way of a revival of socialism. (Socialism is 
for me the substantive core of any radical Leftism.) Socialist internationalism is different 
from liberal supranationalism, including the “pro-Europeanism” of the old and new center 
parties. Among other things this means that “European solutions” cannot make national 
action expendable, if only because they tend not to come forward at all or will be too little 
too late. A revitalization of a socialist politics, as I believe is essential for our future as mod-
ern societies (and if one didn’t believe this, there would be no need at all to care about the 
puny handful of parties and MEPs that have been so thoroughly defeated in this strange 
election), would have to defend really existing democracy, which happens to be nation-state 
democracy, against its “cosmopolitan” replacement with castle-in-the-air supranational de-
mocracy. Democratic socialism begins at the bottom; it must grow from below where condi-
tions are vastly different from country to country, as the varied national election outcomes 
have once again documented. EU-type international institutions must not be allowed to pre-
vent national progress; this is the major and perhaps only reason why they need to be con-
sidered in left radical politics, electoral or practical.  
International solidarity on the Left, then, must above all mean helping other coun-
tries defend their democratic institutions against the arrogance of international technocracy 
and oligarchy, with their once-size-fits-all social an economic prescriptions. Socialism today 
means and requires the freedom for people, and the peoples they form, to determine their 
collective life under as little capitalist market pressure as possible; to build an inclusive col-
lective infrastructure in public rather than private ownership, reversing the devastations of 
privatization during the neoliberal era; inventing and trying out new forms of participatory 
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communal government, in trade unions and local chambers of commerce, in enterprises and 
universities, different in different places, in Manchester different from Vienna, in Gelsenkir-
chen different from Copenhagen, but always in need of protection from “European” compe-
tition law and the constitutional constraints that come with the “four freedoms” and the 
Euro austerity regime. This can only be a long-drawn battle, and one difficult to win. Too 
many are today willing to give up before the struggle has really begun, and are joining the 
new liberal-Green middle-class for a happy liberal-Green middle-class life. Unlike their good 
conscience, however, reconciliation with nature and among people does not fall from any 
European sky. In particular, change for the socially better won’t arrive as a gift from a bunch 
of what will shortly after their election have become 751 like-minded lobbyists for suprana-
tional centralization pretending to be democratic representatives of a European people that 
does not yet exist.  
 
